Unit 4 notes · 4 topics, read straight through
Unit 4: Securing Devices
Every topic in one read: the big idea, the notes, the figures and the exam traps. Practice comes after, on the Unit 4 review.
4.1 Device Vulnerabilities and Attacks
Big ideaEvery device is a door. Unpatched software, weak passwords, autorun and open ports leave it unlocked; malware is what walks through.
1. Types of computing devices (4.1.A)
| Type | What it is | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Server 4.1.A.1 | Provides one or more services to other computers, such as the domain name system (DNS), the dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) or the file transfer protocol (FTP). Any computer can be a server; enterprise servers usually have more power and storage. | A school’s file server |
| Personal computer 4.1.A.2 | Designed for one person’s work or recreation | Desktop, laptop, notebook |
| Handheld computer 4.1.A.3 | Smaller, battery powered; also called mobile computers or information appliances | Tablet, smartphone, smart watch |
| Embedded computer 4.1.A.4 | Part of a machine, with specific instruction sets for the machine’s specialized components; usually slower, cheaper, little storage | The controller in a car’s brakes |
Everyday devices with embedded computers are often called Internet of Things (IoT) devices. They run transportation, critical infrastructure such as substation breakers and water plant pumps, medical equipment such as insulin pumps, and home devices such as thermostats 4.1.A.5.
2. Malware (4.1.B)
Malware is malicious software that can damage or destroy a device or network, or give an adversary access to a device and its data 4.1.B.1. It is usually one tool in a bigger plan 4.1.B.2.
| Malware | Its signature move |
|---|---|
| Virus | Activates only when a user runs or opens a file |
| Worm | Spreads from computer to computer with no human interaction |
| Trojan | Hides inside software that seems harmless, such as a free game that also installs hidden tools; a remote access trojan (RAT) gives remote access |
| Ransomware | Encrypts files, then demands payment for a decryption key within a deadline |
| Spyware | Tracks what the user does and reports back |
| Keylogger | Software or hardware that records keystrokes, revealing usernames and passwords |
| Logic bomb | Triggers only when set conditions are met: a date, an operating system version, a character set |
| Rootkit | Gets into the operating system, controls nearly everything, and can hide itself |
Fileless malware is different: instead of files, it is code living in random access memory (RAM) that misuses legitimate programs already installed 4.1.B.3.
YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED
Documents, photos and projects on this computer can no longer be opened.
To receive the decryption key, pay within 72:00:00.
# ransomware: encrypts files, demands payment, sets a deadline [4.1.B.2]3. How device weaknesses are exploited (4.1.C)
| Weakness | What the adversary can do |
|---|---|
| Unpatched software 4.1.C.1 | Use an exploit for a known vulnerability to crash the system, watch the user, switch on the webcam or microphone, or take full control |
| Weak authentication 4.1.C.2 | Guess the password, or use social engineering to get it |
| No BIOS or UEFI password 4.1.C.3 | Boot into a recovery mode with higher privileges, or load their own operating system from an external drive and change user profiles and passwords |
| Autorun enabled 4.1.C.4 | Malware on an external drive runs as soon as the drive is plugged in |
| Open ports 4.1.C.5 | Connect to the device |
| No firewall, or a misconfigured one 4.1.C.6 | Send malicious data the device cannot filter out |
| No anti-malware software 4.1.C.7 | Install malware more easily |
4. Rating device risk (4.1.D)
Device risks come from unauthorized access or malware that let an adversary impersonate a user, control the device remotely, encrypt its drive for ransom, or wipe it. The level depends on how critical the device, its services and its data are 4.1.D.1.
| Rating | When | Example (original) |
|---|---|---|
| High 4.1.D.2 | Sensitive data or critical operations could be compromised | A water utility’s control computer, which opens and closes valves, accepts remote logins from the office network with no password. |
| Moderate 4.1.D.3 | Weak authentication, or a vulnerability less likely to be exploited | A gym’s check-in kiosk, which holds no member data, unlocks with a 4-digit staff code that has never been changed. |
| Low 4.1.D.4 | Exploitation would have little impact | A lobby display that only shows the bus timetable has an unused service enabled. |
Rate by what could be compromised: if sensitive data or critical operations are at stake, the finding is high even when the weakness is weak authentication.
Now audit a real device report.
Exam traps
- Ransomware encrypts files and demands payment; spyware watches and reports; a keylogger records keystrokes. Match the behavior described, not the scariest name.
- A rootkit hides inside the operating system and can make itself invisible. A RAT gives remote access. Both keep access, but a rootkit is the one described as controlling nearly every part of the system.
- Risk depends on the device's criticality: the same weakness is high risk on a server with sensitive data and low risk where exploitation would have little impact.
4.2 Authentication
Big ideaNever store the password, store its salted fingerprint, so identical passwords look different and precomputed tables fail.
1. Why passwords are stored as hashes (4.2.A)
A cryptographic hash function (also called a message digest function) takes data of any length and outputs a fixed-length string called the hash (also a checksum, message digest or digest) 4.2.A.1. Well known ones: MD5; SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 (Secure Hash Algorithm); NTHash; RIPEMD-160.
An n-bit hash has 2n possible outputs but the inputs are infinite, so two inputs will eventually share a hash: a collision 4.2.A.2. Good hash functions have four properties 4.2.A.3:
| Property | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Collision resistant | It is hard to find two inputs with the same hash |
| Pre-image resistant | Given a hash, you cannot work out the input |
| Repeatable | The same input always gives the same hash |
| Fixed length | The hash length never depends on the input size |
If someone finds an efficient way to force collisions, the function is deprecated; MD5 and SHA-1 are examples 4.2.A.4.
Systems should never store passwords in plaintext. They store the hash; at login they hash what you typed and compare 4.2.A.5. To stop identical passwords producing identical hashes, a unique random salt is hashed with each password 4.2.A.6.
username salt hash
ana 9f2c b144...f5bb
ben 71d0 aed5...2f72 # same password as ana
chen c48a 993b...9be22. Password attacks (4.2.B)
If an adversary gets a legitimate user’s password and the organization has no MFA, they can act with all that user’s access 4.2.B.1.
| Online attack | Offline attack | |
|---|---|---|
| Where | Against a live login portal | On the adversary’s own computer, against a captured hash database 4.2.B.2 |
| Lockout | Slowed by account lockout (spraying stays under the threshold by trying each account once) | Bypasses lockout |
| Methods | Stolen or leaked credentials, often reused across services 4.2.B.3; password spraying, one common password against many accounts 4.2.B.4; credential stuffing, default credentials (switches, routers, IoT devices) or stolen pairs 4.2.B.5 | Hash-cracking tools hash guesses and compare 4.2.B.6: brute force (every possible password), dictionary (a list of common passwords), rainbow table (precomputed hashes sorted by hash, searched for the captured hash) 4.2.B.7 |
3. Authentication factors (4.2.C)
Authentication mechanisms are technical controls that verify identity; each piece of proof is a factor 4.2.C.1.
| Factor | Examples | Strength depends on |
|---|---|---|
| Knowledge (something you know) 4.2.C.2 | Password, personal identification number (PIN), challenge answers | Hard to guess, yet memorable |
| Possession (something you have) 4.2.C.3 | Access card, bank card, phone, authentication token | How hard the object is to obtain or copy |
| Biometric (something you are) 4.2.C.4 | Fingerprint, palm, face, iris or retina, voice | Unique to the person, hard to duplicate |
| Location (somewhere you are) 4.2.C.5 | Wi-Fi signals, global positioning system (GPS) data, time zone, internet protocol (IP) address | Rules allow or deny by location |
Multifactor authentication (MFA) uses more than one factor, so it is more secure than single-factor authentication 4.2.C.6.
4. Login settings that make a device more secure (4.2.D)
| Setting | What it does |
|---|---|
| Complexity 4.2.D.1 | At least one uppercase letter, lowercase letter, digit and special character |
| Minimum length 4.2.D.2 | Longer, more complex passwords take tools longer to crack |
| Maximum age 4.2.D.3 | Forces a change every so many days (often 90 or 120). Some national standards advise against forced changes, because they push users into predictable patterns such as Winter2027! then Spring2027! |
| Password history 4.2.D.4 | Stores previous hashes (often 5 to 10) so old passwords cannot be reused |
| Account lockout 4.2.D.5 | Locks the account after a few invalid attempts (often 3 to 5) |
Try the hashing lab below, then audit a computer’s login settings, like a junior system administrator setting up a shared desk.
Exam traps
- Offline password attacks cannot be detected and bypass account lockout, because they run on the adversary's computer.
- MD5 and SHA-1 are deprecated: efficient ways to force collisions exist. Do not pick them as secure choices.
- A rainbow table is precomputed hashes of common passwords sorted by hash. Salt defeats it because the table would need every salt.
- A PIN and a password are both knowledge factors; using both is not MFA.
4.3 Protecting Devices
Big ideaProtect the device as if the network around it is already compromised: policy, anti-malware, patches and its own firewall.
1. Managerial controls for devices (4.3.A)
| Policy | What it may include |
|---|---|
| Acceptable use policy 4.3.A.1 | Blocking specific websites or types (social media, gaming); requiring software to stay updated; allowing peripheral devices; prohibiting external drives or media |
| Password policy 4.3.A.2 | Minimum or maximum length; minimum or maximum time to keep a password; no reuse; construction rules (no dictionary words, character sets); using a password manager instead of writing passwords down |
| Software installation policy 4.3.A.3 | Prohibiting users from installing software; a process to request software needed for a role; a list of approved software |
2. Anti-malware software (4.3.B)
Anti-malware software (sometimes called antivirus) has tools to quarantine and remove malware that can corrupt, spy on or destroy a system. Malware contains indicators that make it detectable, called signatures 4.3.B.1. The software keeps a database of signatures, periodically scans the device’s files, and quarantines and removes any file that matches 4.3.B.2.
Scanned 48,212 files Signatures updated: today 06:00 C:\Users\Public\Downloads\invoice_scan.pdf.exe Match: Trojan.Agent (signature 7741) Action: quarantined 1 threat found · 1 quarantined · removal scheduled
3. Updates and patches (4.3.C)
When a vulnerability is found in an operating system or software, the vendor fixes it and sends an update; a small update is called a patch 4.3.C.1. Keeping the operating system and applications on the newest version stops adversaries from exploiting known vulnerabilities 4.3.C.2.
4. Host-based firewalls (4.3.D)
- A host-based firewall allows or denies traffic into or out of a single device, adding a layer of protection if the device is on a compromised network 4.3.D.1.
- It is software on the device that follows an access control list (ACL): rules applied in order, first match wins, just like a network firewall 4.3.D.2.
- It can also block specified outbound traffic, and should block every port or service the device does not need 4.3.D.3. For example, a library catalog kiosk might allow outbound traffic only to the catalog server and the update server, and deny everything else.
- Rules can allow or deny by source or destination port or internet protocol (IP) address, service, protocol or application 4.3.D.4.
Audit a laptop’s host-based firewall below.
Exam traps
- A policy is a managerial control even when it is about devices; anti-malware, patches and host-based firewalls are technical controls.
- Host-based firewall rules work like network firewall rules: in order, first match wins. Blocking ports or services the device does not need is the default stance.
- A patch fixes a known vulnerability. An unpatched device is exactly what an exploit for that known vulnerability targets.
4.4 Detecting Attacks on Devices
Big ideaThe device keeps a diary. Read the authentication log for the pattern that breaks normal: too many failures, too many users, default passwords, wrong time, wrong place.
1. What devices record (4.4.A)
- Systems log processes and settings, login attempts, file downloads and user actions; logs help reconstruct what happened before and during an incident 4.4.A.1.
- An indicator of compromise (IoC) is evidence that an adversary has compromised a device or network 4.4.A.2.
- Authentication logs (auth logs) record every attempted login; analyzing them can reveal attacks 4.4.A.3.
| IoC family | Where you find it | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Host-based 4.4.A.4 | Authentication logs, user activity logs, configuration files | Unusual files created or modified; unexpected processes or services; unauthorized configuration changes; unauthorized software installs or updates |
| File-based 4.4.A.5 | Files on the device, usually executables | A file whose hash matches known malware; file names known to come from malware; file paths linked to malicious activity |
| Behavior-based 4.4.A.6 | Authentication and access logs | Many failed logins; unusual login times or locations; unauthorized attempts to reach sensitive data; attempts to elevate privileges |
2. Choosing device detection (4.4.B)
| Criterion | What to weigh |
|---|---|
| Performance 4.4.B.1 | Detection tools use memory and processing power. Anomaly-based tools use more than signature-based ones; many embedded devices cannot run any detection tool. |
| Cost 4.4.B.2 | Enough licenses for every device. An endpoint detection and response (EDR) service from a vendor is expensive but gives unified detection with a central alert platform. |
| Sensitivity or criticality 4.4.B.3 | Devices with sensitive data or critical services are targeted more and benefit from hybrid detection (signature-based and anomaly-based together) when possible. |
3. Judging a device detection method (4.4.C)
- Speed and performance: signature-based detection is faster, and the gap is bigger on devices with little processing power; heavy tools can slow the device 4.4.C.1.
- Phase of the attack: to act on a device, the adversary has already passed physical and network controls. Catching them at the device can still protect sensitive data and critical services 4.4.C.2.
- False positives versus bypass: most device tools are signature-based, with few false positives, but they are easier to bypass 4.4.C.3. Bypassing detection creates a false negative: an attack that happens without an alert. Signature-based tools miss attacks with no known signature; anomaly-based tools can catch new attacks because they look for unusual behavior instead.
4. Reading authentication logs for password attacks (4.4.D)
| Attack | What the log shows |
|---|---|
| Online password attack 4.4.D.1 | One user, many wrong passwords |
| Compromised password 4.4.D.2 | An authorized user logging in from an unexpected place or internet protocol (IP) address, or at an unusual time |
| Password spraying 4.4.D.3 | Many users tried within seconds of each other, from one IP address or unusual ones |
| Credential stuffing 4.4.D.4 | Default user:password pairs tried one after another, often from the same IP address. Pairs like admin/admin point to stuffing; many guesses against one real user’s account point to an online password attack |
| Offline password attack 4.4.D.5 | Nothing: it happens on the adversary’s computer and cannot be detected. If a hash database was compromised, reset every user’s password 4.4.D.1. |
Now be the forensic analyst: hunt through a factory server’s authentication log.
Exam traps
- Offline password attacks cannot be detected in logs, because they happen on the adversary's computer.
- A login at an unusual time or from an unusual place can mean the password is compromised even when the login succeeds.
- Most device-level tools are signature-based: few false positives, but easier for adversaries to bypass.
- For sensitive or critical devices, prefer hybrid detection when possible; for weak embedded devices, signature-based or none on the device.
Notes done
Now practice the whole unit
Mixed questions from every topic work better for memory than one topic at a time. Recall the lists first, then answer exam-style questions and a free response.